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Sneak Peek: Farmageddon? Brexit and 
British Agriculture 
Centre for Brexit Studies Academics have contributed to another Bite-
Size Brexit book which aims to put an industry which has been 
somewhat forgotten in the Brexit debate into the frame: Agriculture. 
Farmageddon? Brexit and British Agriculture, edited by Caroline 
Stocks and John Mair, explores both paths that Brexit could mean for 
Agriculture in the UK. Being an underexplored issue in the ‘Great 
Brexit Debate’, the book remedies that and puts the industry, which 
will impact a huge amount of businesses across Britain, into the 
spotlight. 
Brexit could offer an opportunity for British Agriculture post Brexit, free 
of the Common Agricultural Policy. It could also be a disaster with 
export markets lost, subsidies and bankruptcies. But which one will it 
be? 
As well as a wide range of impressive book contributors, Centre for 
Brexit Studies Director Professor Alex de Ruyter and Researcher 
David Hearne contributed a chapter to the book, weighing in on the 
debate. The chapter, titled ‘The end of agriculture as we know it?’, the 
two Academics discuss how Brexit has the potential to change the 
very fabric of UK agriculture – and not necessarily for the better. The 
two explain why tariffs, regulations and a new-look domestic farm 
policy could come at a cost for UK farmers. 
Enjoy Professor Alex de Ruyter and David Hearne’s chapter below… 
The end of agriculture as we know it? 
Brexit could pose an existential threat to British agriculture as we 
know it. To many, including within the sector, this will sound like 
hyperbole. However, the reality is that agriculture as we know it today 
is fundamentally a product of state intervention and this is true both in 
the UK and across the world. 
Leaving the EU has the potential (and we stress the term) to 
fundamentally alter the state of play in which UK agriculture finds 
itself. This, of course, does not mean that we will suddenly stop 
growing things or raising livestock. But it does mean that the way in 
which this is done, the structure of ownership, the mix of activities 
and, as a result, the countryside itself, is changed utterly. 
The extent to which any of this happens will naturally depend on both 
the outcome of the Brexit process itself, and the future policy 
framework of the UK Government. To this end, we briefly outline three 
key pillars of European agricultural policy and outline how they might 
change post-Brexit – namely the European Union Customs Union, 
harmonised sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, and the Common 
Agricultural Policy. 
The EU Customs Union 
Most of the UK’s food exports go to the EU – £10.8bn vs £4bn to the 
rest of the world. A large part of the reason for this is obvious: the EU 
Customs Union. 
Most countries are deeply protectionist when it comes to agriculture 
and the EU is no exception to this. Consider the tariffs on a leg of 
lamb2 as an example – the EU applies a tariff of 12.8 per cent of 
value plus €222.7 per 100KG on lamb3 a, which gives a formidable 
competitive advantage to a British farmer exporting to France over his 
or her counterpart from elsewhere. It’s unsurprising that 95 per cent of 
British sheep meat exports go to the EU3. 
These tariffs also mean, naturally, that British farmers are protected in 
their home market. The UK’s agricultural imports show a similar story, 
with only a minority coming from outside the EU (of which the only 
significant bit relates to fish from Norway and Iceland and fruits – 
many of which just can’t be grown in the EU or are highly seasonal in 
Europe). 
Their removal would benefit consumers by reducing food prices, and 
there would be substantial pressure on any government to facilitate 
this in the event of a hard Brexit. 
So, the impact of leaving the Customs Union would depend crucially 
on what came next. All options on the table expose the agricultural 
sector to significant risks. 
A comprehensive Free Trade Agreement with zero tariffs between the 
UK and EU27 is one possibility, although agricultural exporters would 
need to get used to the additional paperwork (and costs) associated 
with customs declarations. However, this would be within the EU’s gift 
– the UK would have only modest leverage in such negotiations and 
it’s likely that the EU would drive a hard bargain. 
Moreover, although such a move would enable further FTAs with 
other partners (about which we have heard a great deal from figures 
such as Liam Fox), it is unclear whether they can provide much 
benefit to the agricultural sector. 
Most countries are highly protective in this regard, with China 
imposing a 15 per cent tariff on a leg of lamb, for example. Even with 
a trade agreement, many of these tariffs are reduced rather than 
eliminated – Switzerland pays a tariff of 9 per cent on similar exports 
to China (ibid). 
Still, it could be worse – at least agriculture is spared the issues of 
‘diagonal cumulation’ that would bedevil the automotive industry in 
such a scenario. 
Any new comprehensive customs union with the EU would at least 
guarantee tariff-free access to that market and avoid customs 
paperwork. However, unless the UK were granted a seat in the table 
(and it’s not clear why the EU would do this for a non-member), it 
would run the risk of having to open its agricultural market to third 
parties without any say in the matter. Indeed, as in the case of Turkey 
and Mexico (albeit not applicable to agriculture) it would not even be 
able to guarantee like for like. 
What is certain, however, is that under a so-called ‘no deal’ scenario, 
duties will be payable on exports to the rest of the European Union, 
potentially decimating parts of the industry that are heavily reliant on 
this export market. 
As many readers will already know, differences in customer tastes, 
processing capabilities and various other factors mean that the UK will 
often simultaneously import and export different parts of the same 
animal. 
Beef is a classic example: whilst prime cuts from an animal might be 
sold domestically, carcases are typically exported to the EU. Even 
though prime cuts are of higher value, the extra gains from exporting 
carcases can make the difference between profit and loss. 
Similarly, mince is particularly popular in the UK and so the UK 
imports a significant proportion of its total consumption of this product. 
Since the UK market is highly integrated with the rest of the EU, at 
present this process is largely seamless and aids productive efficiency 
(as well as minimising transport costs). 
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Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) Standards 
Common SPS standards are one of the key elements that facilitate 
frictionless trade within the EU and European Economic Area (EEA). 
Indeed, about 80 per cent of the time spent checking UK imports from 
outside the EU can be attributed to SPS checks. Any delay due to 
these (particularly on the Dover-Calais crossing) could cause 
potentially long queues and thus enormous problems even for non-
agricultural sectors who are reliant on ‘just-in-time’ deliveries. 
As a result, future SPS standards are extremely sensitive on a 
number of levels, and there will thus be enormous pressure for the UK 
to mirror EU standards irrespective of the type of Brexit pursued. 
That being said, SPS standards are certainly going to be a major 
sticking point in any trade deals that the UK seeks to strike. 
Relaxation of these standards is near the top of the list of US 
objectives in any future trade negotiations with the UK. 
Whilst the subject of chlorinated chicken has received a great deal of 
– probably unjustified – media attention, a far greater issue is likely to 
be hormone-treated cattle. 
Whilst currently a banned practice in the EU, hormone treatments are 
common in the US and opening the UK market to permit imports of 
these will almost certainly be a top objective of US trade negotiators. 
It is possible that relaxation of these standards will also be an issue in 
any UK-Australia trade deal, although this is far from certain and their 
use is not as common-spread as in the US. The scientific evidence on 
hormone treatments in cattle remains mixed and, since the possibility 
of harmful effects cannot be ruled out, the EU’s “precautionary 
principle” dictates that they are not permitted. The use of 17β-
oestradiol is of particular concern. 
EU regulations concerning the use of antibiotics are also currently 
being strengthened on public health grounds (micro bacterial 
resistance) and if the UK wishes to maintain frictionless trade then it 
will need to continue to strengthen its own regulatory standards in line 
with these. 
If the UK wants to align its food standards with the US then it will need 
to accept significant hold-ups in trade with the EU as the price of this. 
UK agriculture would face a potential real hurdle on three fronts. 
Firstly, it would face extremely strong competition from farmers in the 
US, Australia and elsewhere. 
It would also need to deal with consumer confidence issues as 
concerns over the use of chemicals in foods (as well as genetic 
modifications) potentially become widespread. As witnessed over 
BSE, this can be damaging irrespective of the scientific evidence or 
provable risk. 
Finally, it would also face restrictions on its ability to export into the 
rest of the EU market, where SPS standards would remain much 
tighter. Any exports would need to prove compliance with all EU 
regulations, which would entail additional inspections and might be 
costly. It is worth noting that animal welfare standards in the US and 
elsewhere are also different to the EU. 
The Common Agricultural Policy 
This is the most difficult area to speculate on, as the UK’s choices will 
depend not just on the future relationship it wishes to negotiate with 
the EU, but also its domestic policy choices. These would be 
constrained by any future trade deals that the UK chooses to do 
(including with the EU). 
The protocol on Northern Ireland in the Withdrawal Agreement 
negotiated between the UK and EU contained several stipulations 
limiting the level of support that could be given to British farmerse. 
Future policy is likely to want to diverge from the structure of the 
existing CAP, which, in spite of improvements in recent years, still 
leaves a great deal to be desired. In particular, it has the effect of 
benefitting large landowners just as economist David Ricardo would 
have predicted in the 1800s. 
In the coming years, it is probable that the UK will want its agricultural 
policy to evolve in a manner that promotes sustainable stewardship of 
the natural environment. However, there is likely to be a trade-off 
between this, changing consumer tastes and the amount that is grown 
domestically. 
Doing so at a time when the CAP itself is likely to change further in 
ways that the UK no longer has much influence over will be 
challenging, particularly if barriers to competition from outside Europe 
(where agricultural subsidies are also far from atypical) are lowered at 
the same time. 
The upshot is that the UK is likely to find its room for manoeuvre 
constrained at a time when the agricultural community finds itself 
buffeted by a series of outside pressures and the UK government 
finds much of its efforts concentrated elsewhere. 
In summary, we would argue that the benefits to the UK from leaving 
the EU, particularly with a hard Brexit are likely to be few, whilst the 
costs are likely to be significant. 
Farmageddon? Is now available on Amazon. Find out more here. 
Farmageddon? Brexit and British Agriculture is being launched at The 
Clubhouse St James’s, London, on Wednesday 24 July 2019 
alongside many of the books contributors, as well as the book’s 
editors, John Mair and Caroline Stocks. Find out more and register for 
your FREE ticket here!    
